

# Beyond Pure Legal Liability: Insights from Canada's Hybrid Pathways in Addressing Environmental Damage

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**Abstract:** Strict legal liability is a primary approach in environmental law for addressing environmental damage but is not the only solution. Effective harm reduction can involve minimizing the extent or likelihood of damage, depending on whether significant benefits are present. While damage-sharing mechanisms can partially achieve this, they are limited by reverse incentives, and market regulation can help reduce environmental harm but is constrained by market freedom and individual rationality. In Canada, the integration of environmental liability insurance and market-based mechanisms like carbon pricing complements strict legal liability, ensuring that companies have the necessary financial resources for remediation and incentivizing emission reductions. A hybrid approach that combines legal liability, market mechanisms, and collaborative strategies offers an optimal solution for reducing environmental harm and improving efficiency. Environmental law should select the most suitable pathway or hybrid model based on specific circumstances. In China, environmental law should adopt a hybrid model that integrates market mechanisms with legal liability to address environmental damage effectively, taking into account the country's specific context and challenges.

## 1 Introduction

The concept of environmental damage has been extensively explored in Chinese environmental legal scholarship, yielding numerous creative and insightful contributions. Many of these have informed and influenced the development of China's evolving environmental legislation. Compared to the concept of "environmental torts," environmental damage focuses on harm to the ecosystem itself rather than to individual civil rights carried by the environment. It reflects the systemic, profound, and often immeasurable nature of such harm. Due to these attributes, those responsible for environmental damage are often subjected to stricter legal liability. (Zhu,2007)

Under the framework of the "strict liability doctrine," scholars have proposed a series of measures aimed at addressing environmental damage. These include enhancing the compensation responsibilities of polluters by requiring them to undertake ecological restoration obligations, thereby ensuring that the costs of their actions are fully internalized. (Peng,2019) Potential polluters are expected to proactively fulfill preventive legal obligations to minimize the risk of environmental harm.

(Ning,2019) To bolster the effectiveness of these measures, the integration of administrative and judicial mechanisms has been emphasized, ensuring robust enforcement of liability systems. Scholars advocate for expanding the scope of oversight and prosecution rights to enable a wider range of actors to monitor and litigate against environmental violations. (Mei,2010) The establishment of comprehensive and systematic legal frameworks for environmental liability mechanisms has been identified as a critical step toward creating a more effective and cohesive approach to environmental governance.

While the "strict liability doctrine" is sound and fundamental, its correctness does not equate to comprehensiveness. Legal frameworks should not aim solely at punishment but also at guidance and deterrence. The primary goal of strict liability is to regulate behaviors, deter intentional environmental damage, and thus prevent harm.(Han,2018) However, complete prevention of all environmental harm is neither feasible nor desirable. (Li,2019) For instance, while transportation systems are known to pollute the environment, they continue to develop alongside efforts to adopt greener energy sources and reduce emissions. (Yu,2009) The law must distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable forms of environmental harm, raising the question: What pathways should environmental law adopt to address environmental damage?

Answering this question is crucial. Overly rigid legal liability frameworks may lead to counterproductive outcomes, ultimately undermining the very system they aim to uphold. Effective implementation of the proposed measures requires a precise and scientific response to this question, which will provide the practical foundation for addressing environmental damage.

The essence of this inquiry lies in converting the cost-benefit analysis of environmental harm into legal design. If the cost of harm is lower than the benefits it generates, the law might permit such harm. Conversely, if the cost of remedying harm after it occurs is less than the cost of prevention, a remedial approach might be chosen. In such scenarios, legal liability may not always be the optimal solution. Legal economics provides a useful analytical tool for addressing these questions, with its ultimate goal being the reduction of environmental harm. This objective can be divided into two sub-goals:

- 1.Minimizing the extent and severity of harm where benefits are fixed (loss minimization);
- 2.Minimizing the probability of future harm in the absence of significant benefits (risk minimization).

The traditional view that legal economics must be built on the basis that costs and benefits can be clearly valued and quantified, otherwise it is difficult to make scientific judgments and predictions. (Huang,2007) But in fact, from the development of traditional legal economics, behavioral legal economics and institutional legal economics and other theories have begun to adapt to the limited estimation, limited rationality and other ambiguous premise, and even criticized the neoclassical economics of complete rationality as the premise of the strict assumptions, there is no fundamental uncertainty, at best, there is a probabilistic risk of the traditional legal economics. (Tang,2015) For the problem of choosing the costs and benefits of the incomplete and uncertain valuation of "the choice of paths to cope with environmental damage", the method of legal economics can not only match it, but also provide us with a new perspective different from that of traditional legal research.

## ***2 The Effectiveness and Limitations of the Damage-Sharing Pathway***

Choosing not to apply strict legal liability to environmental damage does not necessarily equate to an attitude of negligence or inaction. An alternative approach involves distributing the costs of environmental damage among affected parties, a strategy referred to as the "damage-sharing pathway." This pathway can be broken down into two fundamentally consistent but operationally distinct strategies.

### ***2.1 Passive Damage-Sharing***

The first strategy arises in scenarios where environmental damage occurs without any proactive intervention. For instance, when an industrial facility discharges wastewater into a river without facing regulatory consequences, the resulting environmental damage is indirectly distributed among the residents living along the river. (Susan,1999) This manifests in forms such as health deterioration, disruptions to daily life, and impediments to local transportation. A unique characteristic of environmental damage, compared to conventional forms of harm, is its delayed manifestation. This temporal lag makes immediate detection and assessment difficult, allowing the damage to be distributed over time and across a collective group of affected individuals. As a result, the perceived burden of environmental harm may not appear overwhelming.

Economists encapsulate this phenomenon in the theory of diminishing marginal utility.(Chen,2011) The core principle is that spreading losses among individuals who can endure them without experiencing significant harm minimizes the overall impact. In essence, individuals may tolerate marginal losses, reducing the immediate and cumulative perception of environmental harm.(Zhu,1999) However, when the extent of environmental damage surpasses the threshold of what individuals can reasonably endure, more proactive measures are required.

## 2.2 Remedial Damage-Sharing: Lessons from Canada

When environmental harm reaches intolerable levels for individuals, remedial strategies become indispensable. From an individual perspective, remedial actions—such as compensation or restoration—appear to offset losses incurred. However, from a societal perspective, these measures are fundamentally a form of collective damage-sharing, as the resources required for remediation are derived from the public or specific groups, rather than being spontaneously generated.

One exemplary remedial strategy is environmental insurance, a system that effectively operationalizes the principle of collective cost-sharing. By spreading the financial burden of environmental damage over time (temporal sharing) and across broader populations (collective sharing), environmental insurance ensures that the costs of harm are mitigated in a manageable and equitable manner. (Kenneth S,1988) For instance, polluters, who may lack the financial capacity to fully compensate for the damage caused, can use insurance mechanisms to indirectly fulfill their liabilities.In Canada, environmental insurance provides companies with the necessary funds to handle compensation and remediation after pollution and environmental accidents, especially in high-risk industries such as mining and energy extraction, where the costs for compensation and remediation can be significant. In The Mount Polley mine disaster in 2014, millions of cubic meters of toxic wastewater flowed into nearby watercourses, causing severe environmental damage. Within a year of the disaster, Imperial Metals, which operated the copper-gold mine, spent approximately \$67 million on cleaning up the area, restoring the damaged Hazeltine Creek riverbed, and monitoring the water quality of the nearby lakes. The provincial government also spent \$6 million on cleanup efforts. Environmental liability insurance helps polluters bear the costs of remediation, ensuring that companies have the necessary financial resources to address incidents such as oil spills, soil contamination, or tailings dam failures. This prevents situations where a company is unable to bear the compensation liability and reduces the burden on society and the public.

However, the successful implementation of environmental insurance depends on certain conditions. Individuals need access to ecological data and the cognitive ability to rationally assess potential risks. These preconditions underscore the importance of enhanced environmental education and stringent industry regulations to foster responsible decision-making. Through such measures, individuals are better equipped to calculate potential risks and adopt preventative behaviors, thereby reducing their reliance on remedial mechanisms.

## 2.3 Limitations of the Damage-Sharing Pathway

Despite its utility, the damage-sharing pathway has inherent limitations. For example, individuals or entities often prioritize cost minimization, choosing the least expensive insurance options, which may be inadequate for addressing potential liabilities. Furthermore, reliance on collective cost-sharing mechanisms, such as pollution fees or resource taxes, may inadvertently incentivize environmentally harmful behaviors. These mechanisms often act as a safety net for polluters, reducing their motivation to adopt sustainable practices. Over time, this dynamic creates a vicious cycle, with increased environmental harm leading to higher collective costs for damage-sharing, further burdening society as a whole.

Another significant limitation is the challenge of aligning damage-sharing mechanisms with principles of fairness and justice. For instance, mandatory cost-sharing measures, such as pollution fees, effectively legitimize certain harmful activities. By allowing polluters to compensate for their actions through financial contributions rather than prevention, these measures shift the burden of environmental harm onto the public. This dynamic often sparks ethical concerns about whether such forced redistribution aligns with broader societal values of equity and justice. Additionally, adapting these measures to the evolving realities of ecological damage presents a constant challenge, as frequent updates to the system may impose excessive administrative and economic costs.

While the damage-sharing pathway offers a practical means of mitigating the societal costs of environmental harm, its

inherent flaws necessitate careful design and balanced implementation. (You G.,2011) To address these challenges, damage-sharing mechanisms must be complemented by other approaches, such as market regulation and legal liability, ensuring a more comprehensive and effective response to environmental damage.

### **3 The Effectiveness and Limitations of the Market Regulation Pathway**

When the damage-sharing pathways prove costly and yield unsatisfactory results, a more critical approach lies in preventing actions that might lead to environmental harm and encouraging the adoption of safer alternatives. However, this does not mean that legal liability is the only mechanism to achieve harm prevention. In modern societies, individuals tend to engage more effectively with market mechanisms than with direct legal interventions. Increasing evidence suggests that market-based tools can not only prevent environmental damage but also minimize its associated costs, making this pathway particularly significant.(David F,1990)

#### **3.1 Mechanisms of Market Regulation**

The market regulation pathway operates by allowing the market to determine the scope and methods of activities within certain cost constraints. Prominent examples include tradable pollution permits for industrial emissions, carbon offset markets, and natural resource rights trading systems under defined quotas. In Canada, market-based mechanisms are crucial for addressing environmental damage, particularly in the context of carbon emissions and natural resource management. Canada has implemented various systems that leverage market forces to regulate environmental impacts.Canada has been a pioneer in integrating market-based approaches to combat climate change, with carbon offset markets being a key part of the strategy.These markets allow businesses and individuals to offset their carbon emissions by investing in projects that reduce or remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere, such as reforestation or renewable energy initiatives.The central principle behind this approach is granting individuals the freedom to decide whether they prefer to pursue an activity by bearing the associated costs or to shift to safer alternatives within the imposed limits.(P Wesley Schulz,1998) This pathway reframes environmental damage as one of many costs that individuals or entities must internalize, thereby aligning individual behavior with free-market operations and pricing mechanisms.

Market regulation encourages the adoption of safer behaviors by integrating the costs of environmental harm into activity pricing. When these costs are transparently reflected in the price structure, individuals and businesses engaging in potentially harmful activities are incentivized to transition to less harmful alternatives. The extent of this transition largely depends on the relative difference in costs between harmful and safer activities, as well as the benefits of substitutive options. Furthermore, even in the absence of immediate alternatives, market forces continue to exert pressure to innovate and establish markets for solutions that can both reduce harm and optimize costs.

Optimal outcomes from market regulation require the collection and dissemination of information about acceptable costs. This information significantly influences individual decisions and allows collective actions that align with the desired social outcomes. In essence, free markets maximize individual choices, which, when aggregated, produce results that align with societal interests.(Kumar Verma Bhupendra,2015) The market's ability to gather and process information is thus a critical precondition for the success of this pathway.

#### **3.2 Limitations of Market Regulation**

While market regulation offers potential solutions for addressing environmental harm, it has limitations, particularly in its reliance on accurate information and cost assessments.

The effectiveness of market mechanisms depends largely on the availability of reliable data regarding the environmental costs and risks. To function properly, both polluters and those affected by the damage must have access to sufficient information to assess these risks. Although polluters are typically motivated to gather such information in order to reduce their exposure to liability, affected parties may not have the same incentives. High costs for acquiring information, as well as psychological biases—such as the perception that they are not personally impacted by environmental harm—often prevent the public from fully evaluating their exposure to risks. As a result, market-based solutions may fail to account for the broader social costs of environmental harm, reducing the overall effectiveness of the pathway.

Furthermore, individuals and organizations often underestimate the true costs of environmental damage. This underestimation is typically due to a misjudgment of the likelihood or severity of harm. When market mechanisms rely solely on these subjective assessments, it can lead to negative outcomes, such as environmental harm disproportionately affecting vulnerable groups or certain regions. These results not only exacerbate social inequities but also challenge the ethical basis of environmental regulation. Moreover, the long-term social costs—such as community unrest or a decline in public trust—can undermine the effectiveness of market-driven approaches.

Despite its limitations, market regulation plays an indispensable role in the broader framework of environmental governance. By embedding environmental costs into market structures, it creates financial incentives for innovation and sustainable practices. However, its success depends on the establishment of robust regulatory frameworks that ensure transparency, equitable access to information, and coordination with complementary mechanisms such as legal liability and public oversight. Only through such integrated approaches can the potential of market regulation be fully realized in addressing environmental harm.

#### **4 *The Advantages and Limitations of the Legal Liability Pathway***

In many instances, where risk-sharing and market regulation pathways fall short, legal liability often presents a more effective solution. From an economic perspective, while market regulation delegates decisions regarding the costs of environmental harm to the market, legal liability requires that these decisions be collectively made. As a key collective tool for regulation, legal liability is often viewed as a powerful means of enforcement, deterrence, and compliance. It typically manifests in two major forms: the complete prohibition of certain activities or the imposition of penalties on activities deemed harmful to the environment.

##### **4.1 *Legal Liability as a Regulatory Tool***

The fundamental strength of legal liability lies in its ability to provide clear, collective decisions about which behaviors are acceptable and which are not. By placing responsibility for environmental harm directly onto those who cause it, legal liability ensures that the full range of costs associated with harmful activities are internalized by the responsible parties. Unlike market regulation, which often only takes monetary costs into account, legal liability also forces the consideration of non-monetary costs, such as the social, ecological, and public health impacts of these activities. (John T. Dunlop, 1967)

In Canada, strict legal responsibilities are imposed for environmental pollution, particularly in the areas of pollutant emissions and hazardous substances management. Businesses and individuals are held accountable for pollution incidents and are required to take necessary remedial actions. This includes responsibilities such as paying fines, compensating for damages, implementing remediation measures, and conducting long-term environmental monitoring and restoration. The compulsory nature of this legal liability is a critical tool in environmental protection and pollution control, ensuring that those responsible for environmental harm bear the full cost of the damage.

For instance, when an industrial enterprise is found guilty of polluting a river, it is required to compensate for the damage caused, either through financial compensation or ecological restoration efforts. In some cases, this may involve penalizing the polluter with fines, criminal charges, or mandatory remediation efforts. Legal liability, thus, internalizes the costs of environmental damage by holding the perpetrator fully responsible. This approach is especially crucial in situations where harm is not easily quantifiable in market terms, such as the long-term impacts of climate change or the loss of biodiversity.

##### **4.2 *Advantages of Legal Liability***

One of the primary advantages of legal liability, as compared to market mechanisms, is its ability to address situations where individual decision-making is either inadequate or where the market fails to reflect the full external costs of environmental damage. In cases where non-monetary harms are involved—such as the irreversible loss of ecosystems or biodiversity—market regulation often struggles to assign a reasonable value to these losses. Legal liability, however, provides a comprehensive framework for evaluating all damages caused, regardless of their ability to be monetized.

Legal liability is particularly useful in situations where there is no direct economic incentive for individuals or

companies to engage in environmentally responsible behaviors. For example, industries with high levels of pollution may not find it financially viable to adopt pollution control technologies unless they are required to do so by law. Legal liability provides an external motivation by creating the legal imperative to avoid harm and imposing penalties for violations. This provides a strong deterrent against harmful activities, preventing future violations by making the costs of non-compliance more apparent than the benefits of continued damage. Legal liability offers a more direct and immediate form of accountability, ensuring that polluters are compelled to take responsibility for their actions. This contrasts with market-based solutions, where the incentives for harm reduction may be slower or weaker, especially in cases where the polluter is able to externalize the cost of their actions onto society.

#### 4.3 *Limitations of Legal Liability*

Despite its many advantages, legal liability as a regulatory pathway also has significant limitations. One of the most notable drawbacks is that it often struggles to fully account for the long-term and indirect costs of environmental damage. For example, the consequences of ecosystem degradation or climate change may not be immediately visible, and it can be extremely difficult to quantify their effects in legal terms. As a result, the legal system may not always reflect the full scope of harm caused by certain actions, particularly when the effects are cumulative or spread out over time.

Legal liability, while effective at imposing penalties, does not always provide a practical solution for remediation once damage has occurred. For instance, while a polluter may be required to pay fines or compensate for the harm caused, the actual process of environmental restoration can be complex, expensive, and time-consuming. In some cases, the extent of the damage may exceed the capacity of the polluter to remedy it fully. As such, legal liability, while an important deterrent, does not always offer a feasible pathway for addressing the environmental harm once it has already occurred.

Another major limitation of legal liability is its enforcement challenges. Multinational corporations and large industries may be able to avoid penalties or evade responsibility through legal loopholes, jurisdictional challenges, or inadequate legal frameworks. Proving causality in environmental cases can also be difficult, particularly in cases involving long-term or cumulative environmental damage. In situations where the harm is spread over a large area or time frame, establishing a clear and direct link between the damage and the specific actions of the polluter can be extremely challenging. The penalties imposed through legal liability, while they may serve as deterrents, are not always sufficient to cover the full costs of environmental damage, particularly when the damage is large-scale or irreversible. This creates a gap between the legal responsibility of the polluter and the true ecological costs of their actions.

#### 4.4 *The Need for Integrated Approaches*

While legal liability is a vital tool in the regulatory framework for environmental protection, its effectiveness is enhanced when integrated with other regulatory pathways, such as market regulation and damage-sharing mechanisms. A legal system that requires polluters to internalize the full costs of their actions can work in tandem with market-based approaches, such as emission trading or pollution permits, which offer economic incentives for reducing harm. In this way, legal liability can act as a complementary mechanism to ensure that market forces are aligned with broader environmental goals.

Similarly, legal liability can be integrated with damage-sharing strategies, such as environmental insurance or public funds, to help spread the financial burden of remediation across society. This not only ensures that individual victims are not left bearing the full cost of damage but also helps to finance the necessary restoration and rehabilitation efforts. Legal liability is an essential tool for regulating environmental harm, particularly in situations where market-based solutions or damage-sharing mechanisms are insufficient. However, to address the full scope of environmental challenges, it must be combined with other strategies to create a comprehensive and effective approach to environmental governance.

### 5 *Canada as a Model: The Hybrid Pathway of Legal Liability and Market Regulation*

Legal responsibility can coexist with market regulation in many ways, the most obvious one being to prohibit some branches of activity by collective judgment and to control others by the market. (Steven,2013) For example, we could ban the sale and roadworthiness of automobiles that exceed national emissions standards, rather than banning all tailpipe emitting automobiles. Such a mixed path (restriction) implicitly involves the judgment that we only want a certain amount of

environmentally damaging activity, but collectively we don't care who engages in such activity or how it is implemented. For the latter, there are three types of strategies that can be decided: first, randomly; second, those who are more likely to bear the non-monetary burdens imposed on them for engaging in the activity; and third, those who are imposed monetary burdens. The first strategy implies that the collective decision maker has neither a good reason to prefer some individuals to others to engage in the activity, nor does it explicitly want to allow individuals to make choices about their behavior or not, nor can it tolerate the market deciding who should act. Because it does not involve a mix of market regulation and legal liability, it will not be discussed much here.

The second and third strategies are very close to each other in that they leave it to the market to decide who should engage in environmentally damaging actions. The only difference between these two strategies is that one utilizes monetary payments and so may depend on the income distributional structure of society, while the other is associated with the distribution of mitigation. For example, a public pasture may not charge a fee, but it has a limited capacity for livestock, and when the pasture is full, the remaining farmers can only access it after the original farmers in the pasture have left. Here is where the burden is imposed: some may not wish to wait in line, and some may wait forever but never be able to enter. But even so, the goals that this strategy seeks to achieve (ecological security and the absence of direct monetary burdens) can still be realized. And for the first strategy of applying monetary payments, the type of restriction we are most familiar with is taxing the activity regardless of the number of activities involved in the environmental damage. By allowing individuals to choose whether or not to be taxed for engaging in the activity, then those who most enjoy the line of activity will still engage in it, and the market will determine how often it occurs. Of course, the number of people willing to pay the tax and engage in the activity depends on the size of the tax and the consensual nature of the appropriate alternative activity. A decision to restrict activity implies a lack of confidence in the collective decision or in the feasibility of implementing the decision, and if the tax targets the individual regardless of whether he is involved in environmental damage, it implies that the collective decision makers believe that they are making a better decision than the individual, which is analogous to a legal liability; if the tax is imposed on the basis of the implicit nature of the environmental damage rather than on a fixed basis, then the market will look for ways of avoiding the costs of environmental damage as well as deciding who will engage in the activity, ways as well as decide who will engage in the activity, with consequences very close to market regulation.

The hybrid path of legal liability and market regulation restricts activity in a broader rather than a narrower sense, because we are generally more confident in collectively determining the value of the latter to individuals than the former. As in the example of automobiles mentioned above, cars that emit more than the national standard are generally prohibited rather than all cars that emit tailpipe gas, and cars with different emissions are generally taxed rather than taxed equally. Restrictions appear to be inadequate controls on narrowly defined activities for which there are adequate substitutes, and it can be safely assumed that the restrictions result in substantial environmental damage costs. Restrictions on narrowly defined activities may also be impractical because these activities, and their subcategories, are usually more difficult to identify, and the expense of identifying them for the purpose of taxation or other restrictions usually outweighs the cost. In each case, it is impossible to draw a clear line between restrictions and prohibitions, and some measures that come very close to restrictions may also control some narrowly defined behaviors. Even if individuals who violate prohibitions are always punished, the degree of punishment for the violation is insufficient, and then the prohibition or restriction will not be fully effective. The consequence of this inadequate punishment is that individuals will act knowing that they will be punished, which makes them make the same choices as the actor engaging in the behavior being taxed. The greater the penalty, the greater the number of possible alternatives and the closer the restriction is to a complete prohibition. In practice, penalties are almost always not severe enough to prohibit any behavior, and thus prohibitions and restrictions blend together. Nonetheless, we would define some very severe punishments with full moral chastisement attached as prohibitions, and other very mild punishments as restrictions. The practical consequence is to combine the pressure to avoid capture with a restriction on the penalized conduct, the size of the burden being equal to the penalty multiplied by the risk of capture.

A simple example illustrates that a hybrid of the two paths is uniquely advantageous for preventing environmental damage. Society allows adults to smoke because of biological and cultural habits, but then it wants to restrict adult smoking because of environmental air pollution, but it doesn't care when or where adults can smoke (the fact that you can't smoke at

gas stations, etc., isn't because of environmental damage). If this were the only goal, the easiest way would be to limit the number of cigarettes produced, which would cause the price of cigarettes to rise until the demand for cigarettes balances out with the limited supply, or to tax cigarette consumption such that the demand of the purchasers is equal to the amount produced by collective decision. Both approaches are a mixture of legal liability and market regulation, which is more effective than direct legal liability by finding all smokers at fault in causing environmental air pollution.

The situation becomes more complex when considering the costs of environmental damage caused by smoking. Where a party smokes and smoking is shown to be a cause of environmental damage to that party, we can apply simple legal liability to allocate all environmental damage costs. The result would be a partial, not perfect, reduction in smoking, along with a reduction in environmental damage costs. Better results would be achieved by having the most cost-efficient cost avoidance involving the smoker, in environmental damage, bear the cost. To the extent that this approach still leaves many smokers behind (based on a collective judgment about restricting smoking), smoking could be further reduced by appropriate taxation. In addition, if there is so much excessive environmental damage due to smoking that the collective judgment is that smoking is indeed too inappropriate in some cases, then such smoking can be controlled by imposing uninsurable penalties. These programs achieve the collective goal coupled with the market goal better than legal liability alone because it allows individuals who enjoy smoking very much to smoke, and these individuals are harmless. The reason for this is that their smoking (1) does not lead to environmental damage that could have been most economically avoided by quitting, and (2) does not occur in situations where smoking is collectively deemed inappropriate. Abstracting from the concrete to the general, this means that pure legal liability performs better on environmental harm only if there is no desire to minimize the cost of environmental harm and the amount of avoided costs (market goal), nor to reduce faulty or improper behavior (collective goal), nor to achieve both goals at the same time (hybrid goal), but only to reduce faulty behavior.

## 6 Conclusion

The optimal approach to addressing environmental damage does not lie in relying on a single regulatory mechanism, but rather in a strategic combination of multiple pathways. Both legal liability and market regulation have their respective strengths and weaknesses, and when effectively integrated, they can better address the complex challenges posed by environmental harm. However, the hybrid pathway, which combines both legal and market-based mechanisms, represents the most effective and adaptable solution.

### 6.1 *The Limitations of Pure Approaches*

Strict reliance on any single approach—whether purely legal liability or purely market-based regulation—can lead to suboptimal outcomes. While legal liability is powerful in deterrence and holding polluters accountable, it is often limited by challenges such as enforcement difficulties, the inability to quantify long-term environmental damages, and the complexity of providing comprehensive remedies. Conversely, while market regulation is efficient in many ways, it sometimes fails to account for the full social and ecological costs of environmental damage. Moreover, market mechanisms may lack adequate enforcement, and can inadvertently allow polluters to externalize their costs, perpetuating harmful practices.

Therefore, neither pure legal liability nor pure market regulation is sufficient on its own. A purely legal approach may lack the flexibility to address evolving environmental challenges, while a purely market-driven approach may fail to fully capture the broader social and ecological costs of harm. A hybrid pathway, integrating the strengths of both, provides a more balanced and comprehensive strategy for reducing environmental damage while maintaining economic efficiency.

### 6.2 *The Hybrid Pathway as the Optimal Solution*

The hybrid pathway, which combines the deterrent power of legal liability with the flexibility and efficiency of market mechanisms, offers a more adaptable and effective solution. By leveraging the strengths of both systems, it provides a regulatory framework that is both flexible enough to respond to complex and evolving environmental issues, and robust enough to ensure accountability and deterrence.

The hybrid pathway combines legal liability, market mechanisms, and collaborative approaches, and is often considered the optimal solution for addressing environmental damage. In Canada, this approach has been integrated into the national

environmental framework, with a notable example being the combination of legal liability with market mechanisms, such as carbon pricing and carbon offset systems. Canada has implemented a nationwide carbon pricing system, and in addition to the federal level, the province has also introduced carbon taxes, imposing constraints on businesses through either carbon taxes or cap-and-trade systems. This system encourages companies to reduce carbon emissions through economic penalties, while also providing them the flexibility to invest in carbon offset projects as a way to meet their obligations. Additionally, Canada focuses on the coordination of carbon pricing tools with income tax policies. For example, when British Columbia implemented its carbon tax on July 1, 2008, it reduced both corporate and personal income tax rates, while introducing income tax credits for low-income individuals. This means that alongside imposing a carbon tax, the province reduced the tax burden on personal income and corporate income taxes to maintain overall tax neutrality. The flexibility of this hybrid pathway allows industries to balance legal compliance with proactive emission reduction measures, while also benefiting from market incentives.

The hybrid approach allows for a more nuanced and context-specific response to environmental harm. For instance, in cases of severe and immediate environmental damage, legal liability can act swiftly to penalize perpetrators and provide remedies. In contrast, for more diffuse and long-term environmental impacts, such as climate change or air pollution, market-based mechanisms—like carbon trading or pollution permits—can provide incentives for long-term harm reduction while maintaining economic flexibility. Together, these two mechanisms complement each other, ensuring a more comprehensive response that adapts to the complexities of environmental governance.

The hybrid pathway fosters innovation and efficiency. By creating financial incentives for businesses and individuals to adopt cleaner technologies, market mechanisms can drive progress in ways that legal penalties alone cannot. Simultaneously, the legal system ensures that harmful practices are discouraged and that accountability is enforced. This combined approach encourages a balance between regulatory control and market freedom, ultimately promoting sustainable development.

### 6.3 *The Importance of Continuous Monitoring and Adaptation*

Despite its promise, the success of the hybrid pathway depends on continuous monitoring and adaptation. As environmental challenges evolve and new technologies emerge, it is essential that both the legal and market components of the hybrid system be periodically reviewed and updated to remain effective. Regular monitoring allows for the identification of weaknesses in the system and ensures that both legal penalties and market incentives are appropriately calibrated to current environmental and economic realities.

As new environmental threats emerge—such as new forms of pollution or the evolving impacts of climate change—the legal framework may need to evolve to address these challenges. Similarly, market mechanisms should be regularly adjusted to ensure they reflect the true costs of environmental harm and do not allow polluters to bypass their responsibilities. Continuous adaptation ensures that the hybrid pathway remains responsive to both current and future environmental challenges.

The hybrid system requires close coordination between the legal system, regulatory bodies, and market participants. This coordination is critical for ensuring that legal regulations and market mechanisms work in harmony, without undermining each other. For example, if market incentives are too weak or legal penalties are not sufficiently enforced, the hybrid system may fail to deliver the desired results.

### 6.4 *The Path Forward*

Looking ahead, it is clear that no single regulatory approach can fully address the complexity of environmental harm. As the global community faces increasingly urgent environmental challenges—from climate change to biodiversity loss—the need for comprehensive, integrated solutions has never been more pressing. The hybrid pathway provides a flexible, adaptive, and effective approach to mitigating environmental harm while ensuring that economic interests are also taken into account.

For this hybrid system to be truly effective, it must be built on a foundation of strong legal frameworks, transparent market mechanisms, and active participation from all stakeholders, including governments, businesses, and civil society. Collaboration across sectors will be key to ensuring that both legal and market approaches are aligned and mutually reinforcing. The ultimate goal is not simply to reduce environmental damage but to create a sustainable system that promotes

long-term ecological health, social equity, and economic prosperity. By integrating the best elements of legal liability and market regulation, the hybrid pathway offers a promising solution to achieving these objectives. As environmental challenges continue to evolve, the hybrid approach provides a dynamic framework capable of adapting to emerging threats, ensuring that environmental governance remains robust and responsive.

In conclusion, the hybrid pathway of combining legal liability and market regulation stands as the most promising model for addressing environmental damage in the contemporary world. While legal liability provides necessary deterrents and accountability, market regulation fosters efficiency and innovation. Together, these mechanisms form a comprehensive, adaptive, and dynamic system for addressing environmental harm, offering the best chance for a sustainable future. Through continuous monitoring, adaptation, and collaboration, the hybrid approach can evolve to meet the challenges of an ever-changing environmental landscape.

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